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Abstract
How much do cultural biases aﬀect economic exchange? We try to answer this question
by using the relative trust European citizens have for citizens of other countries. First,
we document that this trust is aﬀected not only by objective characteristics of the country
being trusted, but also by cultural aspects of the match between trusting country and trusted
country, such as religion, history of conﬂicts, and genetic and somatic similarities. We then
ﬁnd that lower relative levels of trust toward citizens of a country lead to less trade with
that country, less portfolio investment, and less direct investment in that country, even after
controlling for the objective characteristics of that country. This eﬀect is stronger for goods
that are more trust intensive and doubles or triples when trust is instrumented with its
cultural determinants. Our results suggest that perceptions rooted in culture are important
(and generally omitted) determinants of economic exchange.
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excellent research assistantship. We also thank Franklin Allen, Marianne Baxter, Patricia Ledesma, Mitchell
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University. Luigi Zingales acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Center for Research on Security Prices and
the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago.We always have been, we are, and I hope that we always shall be detested in France.
Duke of Wellington
A survey carried out by the 3i/Cranﬁeld European Enterprise Center highlights remarkable
diﬀerences in the level of trust European managers of diﬀerent nationalities have for each other.
When asked to score fellow managers of diﬀerent countries on the basis of their trustworthiness
their responses implied the following ranking:1
Great Britain France Germany Italy Spain
British view 1 4 2 5 3
French view 4 2 1 5 3
German view 2 3 1 5 4
Italian view 3 2 1 4 5
Spanish view 2 4 1 5 3
Among these managers there seem to be some common views: everyone ranks German
managers relatively high, while Italian ones relatively low. There is also a “home-country bias”:
managers trust their fellow countrymen relatively more than what managers from other countries
rank them. Italian managers, for instance, rank themselves fourth in trustworthiness, while they
are ranked ﬁfth (last) by every other group. More surprisingly, there are some match-speciﬁc
attitudes. French managers, for instance, rate British managers much lower than any other ones
except the Italians. This seems at odds with the ranking chosen by every other group. British
managers reciprocate (as the Duke of Wellington’s opening quote seems to suggest).
These facts are not peculiar to this dataset. As we will show, they are exactly replicated in
an independent and broader survey (Eurobarometer). In this paper we use this larger dataset
to explain why perception of trustworthiness diﬀers so greatly across Europe. We also use it
to explore the economic consequences of these diﬀerent perceptions. As Arrow (1972) states,
there are very few economic activities that do not involve trust. Hence, we study whether these
diﬀerences in perception of trustworthiness have an impact on macroeconomic variables such as
international trade and investments.
The challenge we face in doing so is to disentangle the objective component of beliefs (every-
one trusts the Germans more because they might be indeed more trustworthy) from a subjective
1In total 1,016 managers (managing companies under 500 employees) responded from ﬁve major European
Community countries: Great Britain (433 responses), France (127), Germany (135), Italy (185) and Spain (136).
See Burns et al. (1993).
1component (the British mistrust the French). To do so we rely on the fact that, under rational
expectations, the average belief of trustworthiness of each country should be unbiased. We
equate this to the “objective” belief. To isolate this objective component we regress the level of
trust of country i towards country j on a ﬁxed eﬀect for the country receiving trust (country-of-
destination ﬁxed eﬀects). This ﬁxed eﬀect absorbs all the country speciﬁc characteristics that
aﬀect trust, such as the level of protection that contracts receive, the enforcement granted by
social punishment, the constraints that individuals in a country have in their behaviors due to
binding cultural norms.
Every deviation of beliefs from this objective component (which we call the “subjective”
component) can be due to either a diﬀerence in the information set or to a bias. For example,
the average Canadian may have more information about Americans than the average Japanese
and this greater amount of information can signiﬁcantly aﬀect (upward or downward) her degree
of trust.
We compute this subjective component as the residual of a regression of trust on ﬁxed
eﬀects for the country receiving trust (country-of-destination ﬁxed eﬀects) and ﬁxed eﬀects for
the country trusting (country-of-origin ﬁxed eﬀects). The country-of-origin ﬁxed eﬀects capture
possible systematic diﬀerences in the way diﬀerent populations answer the survey. If on average
the Swedes tend to answer more positively than the Portuguese to all questions, we do not
want necessarily to attribute this eﬀect to the Swedes trusting the Portuguese more then the
Portuguese trust the Swedes.
To disentangle the information components of subjective beliefs from the cultural component,
we then regress the residuals of the above described regression on a set of proxies for diﬀerences
in information. We ﬁnd that geographical distance between two countries, their proximity, and
the commonality between the two languages have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the subjective level of
trust.2
As an additional measure of the degree of information/familiarity between two countries,
we use the number of times a country name appears in the headlines of the major newspaper
in another country. The coeﬃcient of this variable indicates that better newspapers’ coverage
leads to less trust, but overall press coverage has limited explanatory power.
Finally, a variable that could proxy both for information and for culture is the commonality
2In fact, the commonality between the two languages is also a proxy for a common culture. Thus, by attributing
all its eﬀect to information we are biasing our results against ﬁnding any eﬀect of culture.
2in the legal systems. Accordingly, in our estimates we take into account whether two countries
share the same legal family (e.g., both have a French tradition or a German tradition). Sharing
the same legal origin has a positive but not signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of trust.
The level of trust across diﬀerent countries, however, could also be the result of cultural
stereotypes, as Bornhorst et al. (2004) have shown in an experimental setting. Hence, we insert
some proxies for cultural variables.
To capture the implicit positive or negative bias against other nations present in a country’s
cultural tradition, we use its history of wars. People’s priors can be aﬀected by their education
and in particular by the history they study in school. Italian education, for instance, emphasizes
the struggles that lead to the reuniﬁcation of the country in the 19th century. Since the major
battles during this period were fought against Austria, Italian students may develop, as our
data show, a negative image of Austrians. We ﬁnd that countries with a long history of wars
tend to trust each other less, but the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant.
As an additional measure of culture we use commonality of religion. Religion had (and still
has) a great impact on what it is taught in school and how it is taught. Hence, we expect that
two countries with the same religion tend to have similar cultures and therefore trust each other
more. We ﬁnd this to be the case. A pair of countries where 90% of citizens share the same
religion (e.g., Italy and Spain) exhibits a level of trust 6% higher.
Finally, as a measure of cultural similarity between two populations we use the evolutionary
distance between them. Europeans descend two-thirds from Asian invaders and one-third from
African invaders (Cavalli Sforza, 2000). As Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza (1985) have shown,
the genetic distance between two indigenous populations today reﬂect the history of coloniza-
tion of Europe during the Neolithic Age. Since this measure is also highly correlated with a
population’s linguistic roots, we use it as a proxy for cultural diﬀerence between two countries.3
We ﬁnd that genetically distant populations trust each other less. A one standard deviation
increase in genetic distance reduces the level of trust by 27%.
As an alternative measure of distance between two populations, we derive from Biasutti
(1954) an indicator of somatic distance, based on the average frequency of speciﬁc traits (hair
color, height, etc.) present in the indigenous population. As DeBruine (2002) has shown in
3Giuliano et al. (2006) criticize our use of genetic distance as a proxy for cultural distance asserting that
genetic distance is not correlated with cultural variables and it is only a proxy for transportation costs. As
Desmet et al. (2006) have shown, however, genetic distance is highly correlated with several cultural distance
measures. In Section IV we also show that its eﬀects are not due to mis-measured transportation costs.
3an experiment, people tend to be more trusting of other people who look like them. Also,
McPherson et al. (2001) document that similarity breeds connection. We ﬁnd this to be true
also in our international sample. A one standard deviation increase in somatic distance decreases
trust by 11%.
Besides serving as proxy for cultural distance, both somatic and genetic distance can be
interpreted as a measure of genetic dissimilarities. Evolutionary pressures made people learn
to diﬀerentiate between friends and foes on the basis of their appearance. Hence, these two
variables might proxy for a genetic element in trust, rather than for a cultural one. Either way,
however, they are a source of a potential bias that distorts the objective view of trustworthiness
of a diﬀerent population.
Having found evidence that cultural variables aﬀect the subjective component of trust, we
use these variables as instruments to identify the potential eﬀect of these biases in trust on the
level of economic exchange between two countries.
In a world where contract enforcement is imperfect and/or where it is impossible or pro-
hibitively expensive to write all future contingencies into contracts, the degree of mutual trust
is an essential component in any economic exchange. Lack of trust, thus, jeopardizes otherwise
proﬁtable trade and investment opportunities.
We start by looking at the eﬀect of trust on international trade. We ﬁnd that a higher
level of relative trust can explain cross country trade beyond what extended gravity models can
account for, even after accounting for the better estimates of transportation costs suggested by
Giuliano et al. (2006). At sample means, a one standard deviation increase in the trust of the
importer toward the exporter raises exports by 32%.
To gain more conﬁdence on the causal nature of this result, we investigate whether the
magnitude of this eﬀect changes as theory predicts. If trust is an important component in the
decision to buy a foreign good, it should matter the most for sophisticated goods, which greatly
diﬀer on quality. For this reason, we split the sample according to the classiﬁcation in Rauch
(1999). Consistent with trust causing trade, the eﬀect is much stronger for diﬀerentiated goods
than for commodities.
We then instrument trust with its cultural components (the history of wars and the com-
monality in religion and in ethnic origin). Since these factors are unlikely to have been driven
by recent trade or investment ﬂows, we can exclude the reverse causality question. When we
include all three instruments, however, the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions rejects
4the exogeneity of these instruments. In fact, history of wars does have a direct eﬀect on trade
(albeit positive rather than negative). Hence we drop the history of wars from the set of instru-
ments and insert it as an explanatory variable. When we do so, the Hansen J-test fails to reject
that our instruments are exogenous.
We ﬁnd the same results when we analyze the pattern of foreign direct investments. A
country is more willing to make foreign direct investment in another country when it trusts its
citizens more.
One potential objection to our analysis is that the diﬀerent level of trust that the British
exhibit toward the French is not due to a cultural bias in expectations, but to a cultural bias
in behavior. If, for cultural reasons, the French derive a special pleasure from hurting British
people, it is rational for the British to mistrust them. This cultural bias would lead to lower
trust and lower trade, without any distortion in beliefs. To address this objection we look at
the pattern of portfolio diversiﬁcation across countries.
Given the nature of stocks, French companies cannot hurt British investors diﬀerently than
German or Italian investors. Hence, if we ﬁnd that the level of mistrust leads British to invest
less in France, it is not because the French are less trustworthy toward them, but because they
have a bias in the perception of trustworthiness of French people.
We ﬁnd that portfolio investments are heavily tilted toward countries whose citizens are
considered relatively more trustworthy: a one standard deviation increase in trust doubles the
average share of investment in a country. Hence, we conclude that cultural biases operate
through expectations and not through preferences.
While several papers have tried to explain the average level of trust in a country (e.g., La
Porta et al., 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), we are the ﬁrst to estimate and try to explain
the relative levels of trust across diﬀerent nations. In addition, we are able to do so with a rich
data set, which allows us to control for all country speciﬁc factors through country ﬁxed eﬀects
and focus on the characteristics of the match.
In our attempt to explain several international exchange puzzles, our paper is similar to
Portes and Rey (2005). As a key determinant, however, they do not consider trust, but diﬀer-
ences in information, which they measure as telephone traﬃc between two countries and as the
number of local branches of foreign banks. Our paper is also related to Morse and Shive (2006),
Cohen (2007), De Groot et al. (2004), and Vlachos (2004). Morse and Shive (2006) relate
portfolio choices to the degree of patriotism of a country. Cohen (2007) shows that employees’
5bias toward investing in their own company is not due to information, but to some form of
loyalty toward their company, which can easily be interpreted as trust. Both these papers, thus,
illustrate one speciﬁc dimension in which cultural biases can aﬀect economic choices. Our paper
uses a broader deﬁnition of cultural bias and tries to show the pervasiveness of its eﬀects. De
Groot et al. (2004) and Vlachos (2004) study the eﬀect of institutional quality and regulatory
homogeneity on international exchange. While their ﬁndings can be explained in term of similar
cultures breeding higher trust, they are also consistent with other, more traditional explanations
(information, ease of access to legal remedies, etc.). We go beyond these results and show that
trust matters even after we account for these institutional similarities.
Our paper can be seen as a generalization of Rauch and Trindade (2002). They ﬁnd that the
percentage of ethnic Chinese in a country helps predict the level of trade beyond the standard
speciﬁcation. We show this result is not speciﬁc to ethnic networks. Any cultural barrier (or
lack thereof) signiﬁcantly impacts trade and investments.
Our paper is also closely related to a new strand of literature that looks at the eﬀect of
culture on economic and political outcomes (Fern´ andez and Fogli, 2007; Giuliano, forthcoming;
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006; Tabellini, 2005). What diﬀerentiates our paper is the focus
on one speciﬁc (and we think important) transmission mechanism: trust.
The closest papers to ours are Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006) and Bottazzi et al. (2006).
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006) claim that cultural similarities favor the transfer of information
across countries and facilitate the catch-up. As evidence, they show a very strong correlation
between diﬀerences in the level of development (or distance to the frontier) and genetic distance.
Their result can be interpreted as another example of the pervasive eﬀects of trust on economic
activity. As we show in this paper, genetically similar countries trust each other more and, thus,
can transfer technology faster and more eﬀectively. Bottazzi et al. (2006) map the approach
followed in our paper into a micro setting. They ﬁnd that that venture capitalists are more
likely to invest in start ups of countries they trust more, giving additional validity to the results
in our paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a very simple model of the
reason why trust might be so important. Section II introduces our data and shows that 40%
of the variation in trust is not due to objective characteristics, but to idiosyncratic opinions.
Section III relates relative trust to information and cultural variables. Section IV studies the
eﬀect of relative trust on trade, Section V on foreign direct investments, and Section VI on
6portfolio investments. Finally, Section VII concludes.
I Theoretical Framework
How does trust enter economic decisions? One way to model trust is as a degree of precision. In
assessing their opportunities to trade and invest, economic agents make some estimates on the
value of these opportunities. The higher the trust on the counterpart, the better the precision
of the estimate. If this were the only role trust played, its economic impact would be of a second
order. Except for very high levels of risk aversion, trust modeled in this way is bound to have
very little impact on decisions.
Alternatively, trust (or at least the cultural component of trust) can be modeled as a prior
aﬀecting people’s decisions. To see how trust can have a ﬁrst order eﬀect through this channel
we present an extremely simple model, based on a variation of Anderlini and Felli (2001).
Consider two parties, A and B, who can engage in some proﬁtable trade. Let us assume that
A has to spend a cost c to ﬁnd out whether the total value created by this trade opportunity
is V h > 0 (with probability p)o rV l < 0 (with probability 1 − p). After the cost c is paid,
the value V i becomes known (to both parties) with certainty. Thus, if the value is found to be
V l < 0, the trade opportunity will not be pursued.
If both parties behave properly, the value created by this opportunity is equally split between
them. There is, however, the possibility that B behaves opportunistically (Williamson, 1985,
would say with “guile”) and succeeds in appropriating the whole surplus. For example, early
investors in Russia, such as Kenneth Dart, experienced at their own expense the creativity of
local managers in expropriating shareholders. One example was the organization of a shareholder
meeting in a small town in the middle of Siberia after all the air tickets to that destination had
been purchased. Another example is the aggressive use of reverse stock splits (when all Yukos
capital was consolidated into 10 shares) to squeeze out minority investors. Note that both these
tricks are technically legal, thus a good legal system might be insuﬃcient in protecting against
these extreme forms of opportunism.
We assume that A attributes probability π to this set of events. For simplicity, we ignore
the similar problem faced by B. Then, the ex ante payoﬀ of A is




Of course, A will pay the investigation cost c and exploit the opportunity (when proﬁtable)
if and only if (1) is positive. Hence, we have:
Proposition 1 Regardless how big the trade opportunity V h is and regardless how small the
cost of investigation c is, if the level of trust [1−π] is suﬃciently low, the trade opportunity will
never be investigated and hence never undertaken.
A good example of Proposition 1 is provided by the unrealized meeting between Steve Jobs
and IBM. According to Steve Jobs in his memoirs, when in 1980 IBM was desperately looking
for an operating system for PCs, it looked at Apple and invited him to a meeting. Steve Jobs,
fearing that IBM would extract all the surplus from any possible negotiation, declined to go
and, in so doing, missed the opportunity for Apple to become a Microsoft.4 Hence, lack of trust
may lead to ﬁrst order losses.
Thus far, we have only shown that if A expects to be taken advantage of by B with high
probability, then A is unlikely to enter any economic transaction with B.T h er e l e v a n tq u e s t i o n ,
then, is how he will form an expectation about this probability π. Note that the event “being
taken advantage of” is not an easy one to document. If B takes advantage of her superior
knowledge of her country legal code to “trick” A and appropriate all the surplus, this event
will not appear in the oﬃcial statistics as a crime, not even as a contractual violation. Hence,
A will be forced to use a generic prior on the trustworthiness of citizens of country B,w h i c h
he is going to update with his personal experience. We assume that people use their (possibly
updated) priors in answering the Eurobarometer question on trust.
The question, then, is how do people form their priors. In Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2004) we ﬁnd that people’s expectations are deeply aﬀected by the area where they were born,
even if this diﬀers from the area in which they live. Similarly, in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2006) we ﬁnd that the level of trust among U.S. citizens is highly correlated to the level of
trust prevailing in their country of origin. Hence, it is logical to assume that education plays a
large role in forming these expectations. Furthermore, in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003)
we ﬁnd that religious beliefs o ft h et r u s t i n gp e r s o naﬀect how much a person trusts another.
4We thank Luca Anderlini for suggesting this example.
8Hence, religion should deﬁnitely play a role.
Note that none of these forces is properly “economic” in its nature. Hence, there is no reason
to assume that these priors are necessarily unbiased. Take for example, the above-mentioned
case of Italian historical education. The purpose of the teaching is to breed a sense of national
identity. The Austrians are simply the necessary villain. Hence, the dislike toward Austrians is
not the calculated result of a policy, but its undesired side eﬀect: there are no heroes without
villains. In other cases, the bias might be the real goal of a political maneuver (Glaeser, 2005).
In both cases, however, the cultural forces that shape the formation of priors introduce a bias.
In this paper, we will try to estimate the importance of this cultural bias in trust and its eﬀects
on economic exchange.
Note also that our beliefs are perfectly rational, in the common use of the word rational,
which requires beliefs to be Bayesian. In fact, the Bayesian paradigm does not deal with the
process of belief formation and does not address the question of the rationality of beliefs (Gilboa,
Postlewaite, and Schmeidler, 2004).
Finally, negative priors are unlikely to be corrected fast. In Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2007), for instance, we calculate that it takes 81 years of data to convince an individual who
has a small (4%) probability of being cheated to invest in the stock market. Furthermore, if
(1) is negative, A will never try to trade with B and hence will never collect enough data to
overturn her prior. In fact, equation (1) provides a simple rationale for why it pays to build trust
through team work or through trust-building exercises. If two people are put in the condition
to interact when c is zero or they are forced to interact (under the threat of being ﬁred) in
situations where (1) is negative, they will start collecting data on the trustworthiness of their
partners and possibly overcome some biased negative prior. They then will carry and apply this
knowledge in future voluntary interactions.
In sum, the message of this extremely simple model is that lack of trust, which can be
rooted more in cultural traditions than in reality, can cause ﬁrst order economic losses and,
furthermore, is likely to persist over time.
9II Bilateral trust
A Measuring trust
We obtain our measures of trust from a set of surveys conducted by Eurobarometer and spon-
sored by the European Commission. The surveys were designed to measure public awareness of,
and attitudes toward, the Common Market and other European Community institutions (see the
Data Appendix for details). They have been conducted on samples of about 1,000 individuals
per country in a set of the European Community countries. The number of countries sampled
varies over time: there were 5 in 1970 (France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany and Italy),
when the ﬁrst survey was conducted, and have grown to 18 in 1995, the last survey to which we
have access (besides the 5 countries above, included are Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great
Britain, Northern Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, East Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
and Austria).
One distinct feature of these surveys is that respondents have been asked to report how much
they trust their fellow citizens and how much they trust the citizens of each of the countries
belonging to the European Union. More speciﬁcally, they have been asked the following question:
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various
countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much
trust or no trust at all”.
In some of the surveys, this same question was also asked with reference to citizens of a
number of non-European Union countries, which include the United States, Russia, Switzerland,
China, Japan, Turkey, and some Eastern and Central European countries (Bulgaria, Slovakia,
Romania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Czech Republic).
As in every survey, there may be some doubts about the way people interpret the question.
First, there is some ambiguity on how to interpret the answer. In a trust game, the level of trust
maps into the amount of money you are willing to put at risk. Here, this mapping is missing.
Second, we are concerned whether a high level of trust reﬂects a high trust in a generic citizen
of a diﬀerent country or a better ability to identify the trustworthy people in a diﬀerent country,
which translates into a higher willingness to trust them.
To address these doubts, in a separate survey we asked a sample of 1,990 individuals both the
question above and the two following ones: 1) “Suppose that a random person you do not know
personally receives by mistake a sum of 1000 euros that belong to you. He or she is aware that the
10money belongs to you and knows your name and address. He or she can keep the money without
incurring in any punishment. According to you what is the probability (a number between zero
and 100) that he or she returns the money?”; and 2) “How good are you (very good, good,
not very good, not good at all) in detecting people who are trustworthy?”(Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2007). We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst question is highly statistically correlated with the
measure of trust used in this paper, while the second one is not (the sign is actually negative,
albeit not statistically signiﬁcant). Hence, these data provide evidence that the reported level
of trust reﬂects the subjective probability that a random person is trustworthy
There can also be doubts on the external validity of this question. Glaeser et al. (2000),
for instance, raise doubts on the validity of the World Values Survey trust question (which is
similar to the one we use), by showing that it is not correlated with the sender behavior in
the standard trust game (Berg et al., 1995). Sapienza et al. (2007), however, argue that the
sender behavior in the trust game is not a good measure of trust, because it is aﬀected by other
regarding preferences. A better indicator of trust we can derive from the trust game is the
sender’s expectation about the receiver’s behavior. Sapienza et al. (2007) show that the World
Values Survey trust question as well as other similar trust questions are strongly correlated
with these expectations. Furthermore, in a sample of Dutch households Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2007) ﬁnd a correlation between the answer to the WVS question on trust and the
decision to invest in equity. Hence, this survey-based measure does have some external validity.
This World Values Survey-type of question measures generalized trust, the trust people have
toward a random member of an identiﬁable group (e.g., McEvily et al., 2006; Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2004). This is diﬀerent from personalized trust, the mutual trust people developed
through repeated interactions (Greif, 1993), which is more important in relational contracts.
For our purposes, we have ﬁrst re-coded the answers to the trust question setting them to 1
(no trust at all), 2 (not very much trust), 3 (some trust), and 4 (a lot of trust). We have then
aggregated responses by country and year computing the mean value of the responses to each
survey. The result is a rectangular matrix of trust from European countries to European and
non-European countries which varies over time and in size. Obviously, for the European Union
countries the matrix is symmetric in each given sample year.
Table 1 shows two measures of cross-national trust for the all the years in the sample. Panel
A shows the average level of trust that citizens from each country have toward citizens of other
countries. Panel B shows the percentage fraction of citizens that report that they trust a lot
11their fellow citizens and the citizens of the other countries. There is considerable variation in
the level of trust exhibited from one country to another. The average level of trust ranges from
a minimum trust of 1.33 (the trust of Greeks toward Turks) to a maximum of 3.69 (the trust of
Finns toward Finns).
Besides this variability, in Table 1 we ﬁnd the same three regularities found in the small
survey presented in the introduction. First, there are systematic diﬀerences in how much a
given country trusts and how much it is trusted by others (see the last row and last column of
Table 1). For instance, Panel B shows the Portuguese are those who trust the least (only 10%
report that they trust a lot on average) and the Swedish those who trust the most (40% report
they trust others a lot on average). This eﬀect is clearly visible in Table 2, Panel A, which shows
the estimated coeﬃcient of a regression of the average trust of a country toward the others on
country-of-origin dummies, country-of-destination dummies, and calendar year dummies.
In Figure 1 we report the ﬁxed eﬀects of country of origin relative to Ireland. A Swedish
citizen trusts others 16% more on average than an Irish citizen and 26% more than a Greek
citizen. Figure 2 reports the country-of-destination ﬁxed eﬀect relative to Ireland. On average
a Swiss citizen is trusted 15% more than an Irish citizen and 42% more than a Turkish citizen.
Interestingly, there is a correlation between trusting and being trusted. Nordic countries, for
instance, are at the top of the level of trustworthiness and tend to trust others the most. While
not a proof, this fact is suggestive that people excessively extrapolate the level of trustworthiness
of their own countrymen to people from other countries. This result is also consistent with
experimental evidence in Glaeser et al. (2000) and Sapienza et al. (2007).
If all (or almost all) the variation in the data were explained by the attitude citizens of a
country have to trust (being trusted), there would be little hope for relative trust to be able to
aﬀect the patterns of bilateral trade. However, country-of-origin ﬁxed eﬀects and country-of-
destination ﬁxed eﬀects leave a lot of variation unexplained.
Characteristics of the country expressing and receiving trust can (controlling for time vari-
ation) at most explain between 44% and 64% of the variability in trust depending on how the
aggregate trust of a country’s citizens is computed. There remains a considerable portion of the
trust to citizens of a country that cannot be explained by characteristics of either one of the
two countries. Table 2, Panel B, shows the matrix of the residual of the regression. It is this
residual variation we are interested in explaining.
The second feature, similar to the one identiﬁed in the introduction, is that individuals tend
12to be more trusting of their fellow citizens, as the larger values on the main diagonal of Table
2, Panel B, shows. There are a few exceptions (Danish and Swedish trust their neighbors from
Norway even more than themselves), but they are very limited.
Finally, there are some idiosyncratic levels of mistrust as the survey presented in the intro-
duction shows. The British tend to trust the French even less than they trust the Italians and
the Spanish (only 8% of the British trust the French fully) and much less than they trust the
Belgians and the Dutch. The French reciprocate, trusting the British as much as they trust
(little) the Greeks.
III What explains subjective diﬀerences in trust?
The amount of trust a citizen of a country has towards his fellow citizens and the citizens of
other countries will in general depend on general “objective” features of the country that gives
and the country that receives trust as well as by some “subjective” views that are speciﬁc to
the country pair. In order to capture “objective” determinants of trust we include a full set
of country-of-origin (the country that expresses trust) and country-of-destination (the country
that receives trust) ﬁxed eﬀects, as already done in Table 2. These ﬁxed eﬀects will capture any
variable that is speciﬁc to the country and aﬀects its average trust and trustworthiness, such
as the level of protection that contracts receive, the enforcement granted by social punishment,
and the constraints that individuals in a country have in their behaviors due to binding cultural
norms. By controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects of origin and destination in trust, we are left with the
“subjective” component of trust.
When we aggregate at the country level, variations in the subjective component of trust
could be driven by diﬀerences in the information set or by match-speciﬁc biases that impinge
on the view that the citizens of the two countries have of each other.
A Proxies for information
As measures of information, we use the geographical distance between the two countries, their
proximity, and the commonality between the two languages. The geographical distance between
two countries is the log of distance in kilometers between the major cities (usually the capital) of
the respective countries.5 We also add a dummy variable to indicate when two countries share
5This measure is from Frankel et al. (1995). We also tried our regressions with alternative measures of distance
between two countries and the results did not change substantially. Speciﬁcally, we used distance in radians of
13a common land border (Frankel et al., 1995). As measure of language commonality we use an
indicator variable equal to 1 if two countries share the same oﬃcial language.6 As an additional
measure of distance we use the transportation cost estimates introduced by Giuliano et al.
(2006). These transportation costs are measured using shipping companies’ quotes collected
from Import Export Wizard (a shipping company providing transportation quotes around the
world, <http://www.importexportwizard.com>.7
To measure the level of information citizens of one country have about citizens of other
countries, we follow Portes and Rey (2005) and collect the number of times a country name
appears in the headlines of a major newspaper in another country. For each country we searched
the most diﬀused newspaper present in Factiva. For each pair of countries i and j we recorded
the number of articles in the newspaper of country i that mentioned country j or citizens of
country j in the headline. We divided this number by the number of total news on foreign
countries.
In addition to these measures, we use the La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁcation of legal origin
and construct a dummy variable equal to 1 when the legal system of two countries has derived
from the same legal family (i.e., French, German, Scandinavian, English). Commonality in legal
origin may in principle reﬂect the fact that citizens of countries having similar legal systems trust
each other more because there is not so much fear of the unknown. The legal tradition, however,
is likely to be very highly correlated with a common heritage and other cultural variables. Thus,
controlling for common legal origin, we underestimate the potential eﬀect of culture in biasing
the perception of trustworthiness.
B Proxies for culture
We measure the impact of culture with four variables: the history of wars between two countries
in the last millennium, the commonality in religion, the similarity in ethnic origin, and the
similarity in physical appearances.
The ﬁrst measure is the number of years a country pair has been engaged in a war since
1000 until 1970, where we use today’s borders to decide whether a country was engaged in a war
the unit circle between country centroids (Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997) and the great circle between the largest
cities (Fitzpatrick and Modlin, 1986).
6This variable is from Jon Haveman’s website: http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/
HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html>
7Speciﬁcally, we use the cost in U.S. dollars of transporting a 1000 kg of unspeciﬁed freight type load (including
machinery, chemicals, etc.) with no special handling required, using the optimal combination of going through
land and water to transport the goods.
14against another. More precisely, we construct two measures. The ﬁrst one measures the number
of years any two countries were at war from 1000 till 1815 (Congress of Vienna) and the second
one measures the same variable for the period 1815-1970. Presumably, countries that have a
long history of wars and conﬂict will mistrust each other. For instance, the clear tendency of
the French to trust the British less than any other country, as Table 2 shows, may reﬂect the
198 years these two countries have been in war since year 1000. Cultural formation at school
is a vehicle for prolonging the memory of facts that took place many years ago (this is why we
count wars over almost a millennium). Since “history is very much a mythical construction, in
the sense that it is a representation of the past linked to the establishment of an identity in the
present” (Friedman, 1992), we reconstruct wars using today’s borders.
The second proxy for culture is an indicator of religious similarity equal to the empirical
probability that two randomly chosen individuals in two countries will share the same religion.
We obtain this measure by taking the product of the fraction of individuals in country j and in
country i who have religion k and then we sum across all religions k (k = Catholic, Protestant,
Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Orthodox, no-religion, other aﬃliation). To calculate this
variable we use the percentage of people belonging to each religious denomination from the
World Values Survey (see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003).
Our third measure is the commonality in ethnic origin. To measure this variable we use the
genetic distance between indigenous populations as developed by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1996).8
This measure is based on the existence of genetic or DNA polymorphism (a situation in which
a gene or a DNA sequence exist in at least two diﬀerent forms [alleles]). A simple example
of polymorphism is the ABO blood groups classiﬁcation. While ABO alleles are present in all
populations, the frequency of each allele varies substantially across populations. For example,
the O allele is frequent in 61% of African populations and 98% of American Natives populations.
These frequency diﬀerences in alleles hold true for other genes or DNA sequences, as well. As
a ﬁrst approximation, Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1996) sum the diﬀerences in frequencies of these
polymorphisms to derive a measure of how diﬀerent the genetic composition of two populations
is.9
We use genetic distance as a measure of cultural similarity between two populations. Two-
thirds of Europeans descend from Asian invaders and one-third from African invaders (Cavalli-
8See also Menozzi et al. (1978).
9For a more detailed description of this measure see Appendix A.2.
15Sforza, 2000). As Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza (1985) have shown, the genetic distance be-
tween two indigenous populations today reﬂects the history of colonization of Europe during
the Neolithic Age. Since this measure is also highly correlated with a population’s linguistic
roots, we use it as a proxy for cultural diﬀerence between two countries.
As an alternative measure of distance between two populations, we derive from Biasutti
(1954) an indicator of somatic distance, based on the average frequency of speciﬁc traits in the
indigenous population. For heights, hair colors (pigmentation), and cephalic index (the ratio of
the length and width of the skull), Biasutti (1954) draws a map of the prevailing traits in each
country in Europe. In each trait, European Union countries fall into three diﬀerent categories.
For hair color, for instance, we have “Blond prevails”, “Mix of blond and dark”, and “Dark
prevails.” We arbitrarily assign the score of 1 to the ﬁrst, 2 to the second and 3 to the third.
We then compute the somatic distance between two countries as the sum of the absolute value
of the diﬀerence in each of these traits (see Data Appendix A.3 for more details).
Besides proxies for cultural distance, both somatic and genetic distances can be interpreted
as measures of genetic dissimilarities. In the evolutionary process, people have learned to dif-
ferentiate between friends and foes on the basis of their appearance. Hence, these two variables
might proxy for a genetic element in trust, rather than for a cultural one. Either way, however,
they are a source of a potential bias that distorts the objective view of trustworthiness of a
diﬀerent population.
The summary statistics of these variables are reported in Table 3 (Panels A, C, D, and E),
computed for the diﬀerent samples used in the paper. Table 3, Panel B presents the cross cor-
relation matrix (after controlling for country-of-origin and country-of-destination ﬁxed eﬀects),
which shows that somatic and genetic distances are highly correlated (0.53).
C Empirical results
In Table 4 we report the results of our estimates on the determinants of trust. Our dependent
variable is average trust.10 Since all the regressions contain a ﬁxed eﬀect for the country trust
comes from and a ﬁxed eﬀect for the country with respect to which trust is expressed, it is as
if we isolate the subjective component of trust.
To avoid understating the standard errors due to repeated observations, we follow Bertrand,
10We obtained similar results (not reported) when we use as dependent variable the percentage of individuals
trusting a lot.
16Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004) and collapse the data by taking time averages of our right and
left-hand side (after partialling out time eﬀects). In addition, we cluster the standard error at
the pair-of-countries level.11
Table 4, Panel A shows the results for the whole sample, while Panel B focuses on the
sample of European Union countries used in our regressions on the eﬀects of trust on trade,
foreign direct investment, and portfolio investments.
We start by regressing the average level of trust of citizens of country i t o w a r d sc i t i z e n so f
country j on our proxies for diﬀerences in the information sets (Column 1 in Table 4, Panel A).
If familiarity breeds trust, we should expect that distance and common language have a positive
eﬀect on trust.
More information, however, allows to make more precise inferences about other populations’
trustworthiness, which does not necessarily imply more or less trust on average.
Common language has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on trust. Having a common language
increases trust by 10 percentage points, which is roughly one-fourth of a standard deviation.
A greater distance between two countries reduces the level of trust between them. One stan-
dard deviation increase in log distance decreases trust by 15 percentage points, corresponding
to 38% of its standard deviation. By contrast, the common border dummy has a negative sign,
but it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In column 2 we introduce our cultural variables. The results show that cultural factors are
overall important. The three cultural proxies are jointly statistically signiﬁcant with an F-test of
7.00. Religious similarity has a positive impact on trust: compared to a case where no common
religion is shared, a match where 90% of the citizens share the same religion (e.g., Italy and
Spain) raises trust by 15 percentage points (corresponding to 40% of its standard deviation).
The coeﬃcient of genetic distance shows that citizens of a country tend to be more trusting
of citizens of countries who are genetically closer. A one standard deviation increase in genetic
distance lowers bilateral trust by 10 percentage points, corresponding to 27% of its standard
deviation. The number of years two countries have been at war has a negative eﬀect on match-
speciﬁc trust, though it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In column 3 we break down the history of wars into wars of the last two hundred years (after
the Vienna Congress) and those between 1000 and 1815. As one would expect, if these cultural
11Since we have both the trust from France to Great Britain and from Great Britain to France, and all
the bilateral regressors for this pair of countries is unchanged, we need to assume that their residuals are not
independent. If we do not perform this correction, the standard errors are much lower.
17biases against an enemy fade over time, the impact of recent wars is more than ﬁve times that
of distant wars, but neither eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant.
In column 4 we add somatic distance to this speciﬁcation. This variable has a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on trust. One standard deviation increase in somatic distance
lowers bilateral trust by 4 percentage points, corresponding to 11% of its standard deviation.
Not surprisingly (given the high correlation with genetic distance), the introduction of somatic
distance lowers the impact of genetic distance by 40%, making it signiﬁcant only at the 10%
level. Since both variables are trying to capture the same dimension, in the following regressions
we will drop the least signiﬁcant of the two, i.e., genetic distance.
All these eﬀects are not driven by the home bias in trust. In fact, in regressions 1-4 we
insert a variable equal to 1 when the country trusting is equal to the country trusted. In the
remaining regression, the diagonal is dropped since the variable press coverage is not deﬁned
for the home country.
In column 5 we add to the previous speciﬁcation a direct measure of the knowledge that
citizens of country i have of citizens of country j measured by press coverage. The coeﬃcient
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The most likely interpretation of this result is that
newspapers tend to report bad news and this creates a negative bias, which is stronger the more
news about a country are reported.12
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) document that in the United States diﬀerences in income
are important factors in explaining trust within a community. In column 6 we try to see
whether these ideas also apply to trust across communities (or countries) by inserting the relative
diﬀerence in gross domestic product per capita as an additional regressor. Conﬁrming Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002), this variable has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on trust, but
its insertion does not change the magnitude of the coeﬃcients of the other variables substantially.
One variable that can be interpreted as a proxy for diﬀerences in the information set and/or
12To understand whether relative trust is driven by information or, alternatively, some perception of the
pleasantness of individual in other countries we construct a variable that measures perceived pleasantness. In
Eurobarometer 38.0 survey respondents from six European countries (France, West Germany, Great Britain,
Northern Ireland, Spain, and Italy) were asked to rank citizens from other 12 European countries in terms of
their perceived pleasantness. The following question was asked: “Which countries of the European Community
are in your opinion the most pleasant (at most 3 answers possible)?”. We coded 1 if country j was mentioned
by citizen of country i and we use the percentage of times in which country j was mentioned by all the citizens
of country i, as a measure of how much citizens of country i think citizens of country j are pleasant people.
Interestingly, when we introduce the percentage of citizens of country i that have mentioned citizens of country j
(non reported regression) as the most pleasant citizens in European Union, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of perceived
pleasantness is positive and signiﬁcant.
18cultural distances is the commonality of legal origin. We insert it in column 7. It has a positive
but not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on trust. As expected, it captures some of the eﬀect of
cultural distance, reducing the eﬀect of both religion and genetic distance, but both remain
statistically signiﬁcant. For this reason, we control for commonality of legal origin in all our
subsequent regressions. Note that for the reason stated above this is clearly an overcontrolling,
which biases against ﬁnding any eﬀect of our cultural variables.
In Panel 4.B we re-estimate all the speciﬁcations reported in Panel 3.A restricting the sample
to the European Union countries, which we will use in our trade and investment analysis. The
eﬀects are very similar to the ones found in the whole sample. For this sample, we also have the
measure of transportation costs computed by Giuliano et al. (2006). They claim that genetic
distance is just a proxy for transportation costs, which are mis-measured by the log distance
between two countries. To address this concern, in column (8) we add transportation costs
to the regression. Transportation costs have a negative eﬀect on trust, but this eﬀect is not
statistically signiﬁcant. More importantly, all the other eﬀects (in particular the one of somatic
distance) are not aﬀected.
IV The Eﬀect of Trust on Trade
Now that we have a better sense of the determinants of relative trust we can explore what its
eﬀects are. Is it true, as the model in Section I suggests, that trust (or lack thereof) can have
ﬁrst order economic eﬀects? More importantly, can we establish that the subjective component
of trust have an impact on economic exchange? To do so, we try to see what the eﬀect of trust
is when inserted in traditional models of economic exchange across countries. We start with
trade of goods and services.
AD a t a
The ﬁrst variables we use is data on trade of goods and services assembled by Statistics of
Canada. The World Trade Database is derived from United Nations COMTRADE data. Its
advantage over other datasets is that it provides bilateral trade statistics at the 4-digit SITC
(Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation) level.13 This database provides time-series of
trade value, disaggregated according to trading partner and 4-digit SITC level, for the period
13We also used an aggregate OECD dataset, based on custom data, and found very similar results.
191970-1996. Of this long panel we only use data for the years that trust survey data are available
(1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, and 1996).
To ensure complete homogeneity of the sample as far as bilateral trade conditions are con-
cerned, we restrict our sample to countries belonging to the European Union (16 countries). For
the countries that entered the European Union after 1970 we include observations only after the
admission date (for example, Greece is included in the sample only for the years after 1981).
The sample statistics for the data are reported in Panel C of Table 3.
B Empirical Results
Table 5, Panel A, estimates the eﬀect of trust on the amount of trade between two countries. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the total exports from country i to country j aggregated
over 4-digit SITC industries. Hence, we do not have any zero ﬂow observation.
Column 1 presents the standard gravity regression (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003),
with the addition of our measure of trust of the importing country toward the exporting one,
the Giuliano et al. (2006) measure of transportation costs, country ﬁxed eﬀects both for the
importing and the exporting countries, and calendar year dummies.14 The standard errors
reported in brackets are clustered at the pair-of-country level.
As in the standard gravity equation, a greater distance between two countries negatively
aﬀects the level of exports, while the presence of a common border and of a common language
positively aﬀects it. All these eﬀects are highly statistically signiﬁcant.
Unlike the standard gravity equation, the GDP of the importing country and the GDP of
the exporting country are not very economically signiﬁcant. The reason is that we control for
exporting and importing country ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence, the coeﬃcient on the GDP only captures
the eﬀect of the time series variation in these variables.
As in Giuliano et al. (2006) the transportation costs measure has a negative eﬀect on trade,
which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
After controlling for all these variables, our measure of trust has a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade. The eﬀect is also economically very large. One standard deviation
increase in trust increases exports to a country by 11 percentage points.
There are at least three reasons to worry about this ordinary least squares result. First, while
14Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue against the insertion of “remoteness” into the gravity equation.
Our results are unchanged if we add a measure of remoteness.
20it is possible that trust fosters trade, it is equally possible that trade breeds trust. In fact, even
our simple model in Section I suggests that interaction can breed trust. The second problem is
that relative trust can capture the eﬀect of other omitted variables (for example the existence of
established trading outposts, as suggested by Rauch and Trindade, 2002). Finally, measurement
error in the variable trust may aﬀect our results. To address these concerns we instrument our
trust variable, by using the generalized method of moments estimator (GMM-IV), which allows
for heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
As instruments, in column 2 of Table 5, Panel A, we use the cultural determinants of trust
(history of war, commonality of religion, and somatic distance). Since we have already shown
that these variables are correlated with relative trust, these will be valid instruments if we can
argue that they do not have a direct eﬀect on trade.
Among these instruments, the most problematic one is the history of wars. It is not only
possible, but also likely, that wars disrupt trade or open new trade routes depending on the war.
In fact, when jointly used, the three instruments do not pass the Hansen J-test for overidentifying
restrictions.
For this reason, in column 3 we drop the number of years at war as an instrument and
we control for it in the regression. Interestingly, the number of years at war has a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade (suggesting that either wars explode between trading
partners or that wars facilitate commerce).
These two instruments pass the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions. So if we
believe that at least one is a legitimate instrument, both of them are. It is hard to think why
somatic distance might have a direct eﬀect on trade. The most plausible objection is the one
raised by Giuliano et al. (2006), who claim that the somatic or genetic distances are capturing
the eﬀect of transportation costs. Geography - claim Giuliano et al. (2006) - clearly had
an impact on Neolithic invasions, which historically determined the somatic/genetic similarity
across populations. Geography, however, still impacts transportation costs, which clearly impact
trade. Hence, if transportation costs are not controlled for, somatic distance might capture the
eﬀect of the omitted transportation costs. Since we control for the Giuliano et al. (2006)
measure of transportation costs (in addition to the standard log distance), we are not subject
to this criticism.
One additional source of concern is the remarkable diﬀerence between the estimated coeﬃ-
cient of trust in the OLS regression and the GMM-IV one. A possible explanation is that our
21instruments may be only weakly correlated with trust. If this is the case, then the two stage
least squares regressions will be biased and the standard errors misleading. To address this con-
cern, we compute the F statistics for the joint hypothesis that the instruments’ coeﬃcients are
zero in the ﬁrst stage regression and report it at the bottom of the table. In this speciﬁcation,
the F-test is 18, comfortably above the threshold recommended by Stock and Yogo (2002).
An alternative explanation for the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient is that our trust measure is a
noisy measure of the true trust between two countries (a very likely possibility). If this is the
case, the increase in the coeﬃcient is the result of a reduction in the standard attenuation bias
present when variables are measured with error. If this is the case, the true economic eﬀect is
closer to the GMM-IV estimates, which suggests a much larger result. One standard deviation
increase in trust increases export to a country by 63 percentage points.
In columns 5 and 6 we re-estimate the OLS and GMM-IV by introducing the commonality
in legal origin dummy. As for the trust regression, this variable can have two interpretations.
It can capture the fact that similar institutions foster more trade because they provide more
guarantee to the parties involved (De Groot et al., 2004; Vlachos, 2004). Alternatively, it can
capture part of the cultural eﬀect. Consistent with this latter interpretation, the coeﬃcient on
trust decreases, especially in the GMM-IV. Nevertheless, it remains highly economically and
statistically signiﬁcant.
Another possible objection is that trust, especially the subjective component of trust, might
pick up some other cultural similarities such as commonalities in taste. If two countries share
the same taste for consumption (for example, for cheese), they might trade more. To address
this problem we construct an index of similarity in consumption patterns across countries. This
index is calculated computing domestic consumption as the sum of gross domestic production
in each ISIC code plus import and minus export between 1989 and 1994. For each pair of
countries, then, we compute the correlation in consumption across ISIC sectors.15
When we insert this variable in the OLS speciﬁcation of our trade regression, the sign is
negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. In the GMM-IV the sign is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In both cases, however, the size and the statistical signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcient of trust are unaﬀected.
In Table 5, Panel B, we test whether the impact of trust on trade varies according to what
15Data on consumptions are calculated extracting data from the following dataset http://econ.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21085384~pagePK:64214825~piPK:
64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
22theory would suggest. Our hypothesis predicts that trust should matter more for goods whose
quality can diﬀer more. For these goods, contracts are more diﬃcult to write and hence they
are more likely to leave gaps, where trust plays a very important role.
For this reason, we split the sample according to Rauch’s (1999) goods classiﬁcation. Rauch
distinguishes between goods traded in an organized exchange, goods with a reference price, and
diﬀerentiated goods. Clearly, goods can be traded in an organized exchange only if they are
very homogenous in quality. Similarly, they can have a reference price, only if they are not too
dissimilar in their intrinsic quality. Hence, Rauch’s (1999) classiﬁcation can also be interpreted
as a classiﬁcation of the degree of trust-intensiveness of the diﬀerent goods.16
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 5, Panel B, present our basic regressions (both OLS and
GMM-IV) for the subgroup of industries classiﬁed as organized exchange goods, while the last
four columns present the results for industries classiﬁed as diﬀerentiated goods. In these re-
gressions we use data at the 4-digit SITC level. Given the level of desegregation, some zero
observations are present even if we analyze trade among countries in the European Union, which
trade intensively with each other. To address this, following Linders and de Groot (2006), we
eliminate the zero ﬂow observations.
The eﬀect of trust is consistently stronger for diﬀerentiated goods: trade increases 39%
versus 5% percent in response to one-standard deviation increase in trust. This diﬀerence is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The magnitude of this eﬀect is not very diﬀerent from the one found by Rauch and Trindade
(2002). They ﬁnd that the presence of ethnic Chinese networks increases the amount of bilateral
trade in diﬀerentiated goods by 60%.
As an aside, it is interesting to notice the diﬀerential eﬀect of transportation costs for goods
traded in organized exchanges and diﬀerentiated goods. That transportation costs reduce trade
much more for commodities than for diﬀerentiated goods reassures us that the Giuliano et al.’s
(2006) proxy for transportation costs is a good one.
16Rauch (1999) made a “conservative” and a “liberal” classiﬁcations of industries. To minimize ambiguity we
excluded industries that were classiﬁed in diﬀerent ways under the two classiﬁcations and run our regressions
only for organized exchange goods and diﬀerentiated goods.
23V Foreign direct investment
If the subjective component of trust has an impact on trade, it should have even a bigger impact
on the willingness to invest in a country. For this reason, we study the impact of trust on foreign
direct investments (FDI).
AD a t a
Statistics on FDI transactions and positions are based on the database developed by the OECD
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Aﬀairs. These statistics are compiled according
to the concept used for balance of payments (ﬂows) and international investment positions
(stocks) statistics. We only use data for countries that belong to the European Union for the
years when trust survey data are available (1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, and 1996).
According to the classiﬁcation used in the balance of payment accounts, a foreign direct
investment enterprise is an incorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor (a resident of
another country) has at least 10% of the shares or voting power. As for trade, we restrict our
attention to country members of the European Union, where the same rules for FDI apply.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 3, Panel D.
B Empirical Results
Table 6 reports the eﬀect of trust of people of country i towards people of country j on the
foreign direct investments of country i in country j. The dependent variable is measured as the
log of the stock of FDI from country i to country j. The standard errors reported in brackets
are clustered at the pair-of-country level.
Column 1 reports the basic speciﬁcation where, in addition to mean trust, we have country
ﬁxed eﬀects, border, language, distance, press coverage, and number of years at war.17 The
impact of trust is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. One standard deviation increase in trust
raises the level of FDI by 32%. This eﬀect increases six times when we use instrumental variables
(column 2). This might be a problem of weak instruments since the F-test on the coeﬃcients of
the instruments in the ﬁrst stage regression is equal to F(2,73)=9.19. As reported in the table,
these two instruments pass the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions.
17Since number of years at war was signiﬁcant in the trade regressions, we also inserted it here. Dropping it
does not impact the signiﬁcance and the magnitude of other results.
24That the magnitude of the impact of trust on FDI is twice as large as the impact on trade
is not surprising. Since FDI are long-term investments, they are more subject to contract
incompletness than any trade, even the trade of diﬀerentiated goods. As such, they should be
very trust intensive.
In columns 3 and 4, we insert the common origin of the law dummy. Not surprisingly, this
dummy has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of FDI. In fact, countries
with the same origin of the law have more than 100% more FDI in each other. This result is
consistent with Bottazzi et al. (2006), who ﬁnd that venture capitalists are more likely to invest
in start ups of countries they trust more. When we control for the common origin of the law
dummy, the F-test of excluded instruments in the ﬁrst stage regression is 13.16, comfortably
above the Stock and Yogo (2002) threshold; hence weak instruments are not a problem.
In columns 5 and 6, we insert the Giuliano et al. (2006) measure of transportation costs.
Transportation costs should not have a direct eﬀect on FDI but could have an indirect one.
Transportation costs act as a barrier to trade, which might induce direct investment as a sub-
stitute to export. Indeed we ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient that is statistically signiﬁcant only in the
GMM-IV speciﬁcation. If anything the impact of trust is increased.
VI International Portfolio Diversiﬁcation
That culture aﬀects trust and, through it, trade does not necessarily imply that culture aﬀects
it through its impact on people’s prior. An alternative interpretation is that it works through
preferences. If, for cultural reasons, British derive a special pleasure from hurting French, it is
rational for the French to mistrust them. This cultural bias would lead to lower trust, lower
trade, and lower FDI.
To investigate this hypothesis, we focus on the pattern of portfolio investments. By con-
struction, portfolio investments involve investments in minority positions in foreign companies.
If British derive a special pleasure from hurting French, they will be unable to do it selectively
when the French have invested in a minority position, because their actions would mostly aﬀect
the other investors, who are the majority and are unlikely to be French.
This is a very demanding test, because the eﬀect of trust on portfolio allocations is likely to be
small for two reasons. First, most portfolio investments are in traded securities that are heavily
monitored and regulated, where the risk of misappropriation is somewhat limited. Second, we
25have data only for portfolio allocations of mutual funds, which are run by sophisticated managers
less likely to be subjected to this type of biases.
This test is also a robustness test on our exclusion restrictions. Religion similarity and
somatic distance are unlikely to have any direct eﬀect on the patterns of trade, but they deﬁnitely
have no direct eﬀect on portfolio diversiﬁcation.
AD a t a
Ideally, we would like to have data on the international diversiﬁcation of individual investors.
These data, however, are not available on a consistent basis. Hence, we resort to portfolio data
from institutional investors.
The data we use is from Morningstar, which has kindly provided us with the geographical
breakdown of equity investment of European mutual funds disaggregated by country of origin.
We exclude funds located in Luxembourg and Ireland when they are aﬃliated with companies
located in other European countries.
This dataset includes all funds that report their positions to Morningstar (including bal-
anced and ﬂexible funds, for example). Bonds investments, however, are not included. Sample
statistics are reported in Panel E of Table 3.
B Empirical Results
Table 7 reports the empirical results. The dependent variable is the percentage of the equity
portfolio of mutual funds located in country i that is invested in equity of country j,w h e r ei  =
j.
In a traditional portfolio model, the only explanatory variables would be the inverse of the
covariance of stock market returns and the weight of the stock market of country i in the world
portfolio. Since we include country ﬁxed eﬀects (and the data are just one cross section), this
latter variable is absorbed by them. Hence, the benchmark model would have only the inverse
of the covariance of stock market returns as explanatory variable.
To this benchmark we add the standard proxies for information: a dummy for common
borders, a dummy for common language, the logarithm of the distance between the two capitals,
and the number of years at war.
Interestingly, of all these variables only the number of years at war is statistically signiﬁ-
cant. As for trade and FDI, the eﬀect is positive. Countries that have fought more have more
26interchange.
As column 1 (Table 7) shows, the degree of trust country i has toward country j has a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the percentage of equity invested by country i in
country j. One standard deviation increase of the trust of people in country i toward people in
country j increases the portfolio share of country i in country j by 3 percentage points, which
corresponds to an 88% increase in the mean share.
In column 2 (Table 7) we instrument our measure of trust with the two cultural instruments
(commonality of religion and somatic distance). The coeﬃcient of trust doubles. The F-test on
the coeﬃcients of the instruments in the ﬁrst stage regression is equal to F(2,64)=13.53, ruling
out the problem of weak instruments. As reported in the table, these two instruments pass the
Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions.
In columns 3 and 4 we re-estimate the same regression respectively by OLS and GMM-IV
after inserting press coverage. As in Portes and Rey (2005), press coverage has a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on portfolio shares. Needless to say, this correlation could reﬂect
the incentives that national press has in reporting information about countries where national
investors invest more. Controlling for this additional variable, however, does not aﬀect the
previous results.
In columns 5 and 6 we control for the same origin of the law. Not surprisingly, this variable
has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the portfolio investments. This eﬀect is very
strong: on average, a country invests 8 percentage points more in equity of another country if
they share the same legal origin. As for trade and FDI, the eﬀect of commonality of legal origin
captures some of the eﬀect of trust, and the coeﬃcient of trust in the GMM-IV regression drops
by half. In this case, it also becomes statistically insigniﬁcant.
To test whether the eﬀect of common legal origin is due to similarity in culture or to fa-
miliarity in the law regulating security investments, we follow Vlachos (2004) and construct an
index of similarity in security law based on the work of La Porta et al. (2005). This measure is
computed as the sum of the absolute diﬀerence between the score in the 21 dimensions of the
security law analyzed by La Porta et al. (2005).
In columns 7 and 8 we replace the commonality of legal origin, with this measure of distance
in security law. This variable has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the amount of
investments, suggesting that citizens in countries with bad investment protection want to invest
more in countries with better protection of investors. This result rejects the hypothesis that
27the eﬀect of commonality in legal origin captures a familiarity eﬀect. As expected, the eﬀect of
trust is positive and statistically signiﬁcant both in the OLS and in the GMM-IV speciﬁcation.
Overall, these results suggest that an increase in trust has an economically and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the level of trade, direct investments, and portfolio investments. These
eﬀects do not seem to be driven by diﬀerences in preferences, but by diﬀerences in priors across
countries.
VII Conclusions
In this paper we show that trust among European Union countries diﬀers in systematic ways,
which are correlated to the diﬀerent cultural heritages. Even after controlling for a country’s ob-
jective characteristics and for diﬀerences in the information sets, historical and cultural variables
aﬀect the propensity of the citizens of a country to trust the citizens of another country.
These diﬀerences in trust seem to have economically important eﬀects on trade, portfolio
investments, and foreign direct investments. These macro results are conﬁrmed in a micro study
by Bottazzi et al. (2006). They ﬁnd that the trust of the country of origin of a venture capitalist
toward another country positively aﬀects his propensity to invest in a start up of that country.
Note that both these results are obtained within the boundaries of the old European Union,
which comprised fairly culturally homogenous nations. That culture represents an important
barrier to integration even inside the old European Union suggests that its eﬀect on world trade
might be much larger.
While our results are suggestive that these eﬀects can be economically important, they do
not allow us to derive any welfare conclusion. First, we identify these eﬀects by looking at the
impact of relative trust on the relative level of trade. As a result, our methodology cannot
identify the impact of the average level of trust on the total volume of trade and hence the
welfare implications of our results. If we assume that the eﬀect estimated using within country
variations applies also between countries, we then have that the level of trustworthiness makes
Switzerland trade 40% more than Ireland and Turkey 73% percent below. Second, we document
only eﬀects on quantities not on welfare. If it is costless for British to substitute French cheese
with identical cheese coming from other countries they trust more, then the utility loss they
suﬀer could be minimal. If that is not the case, then the welfare losses can be substantial. Only
future research will be able to tell.
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32Data Appendix
A.1. - The Eurobarometer surveys
The Eurobarometer surveys are the products of a unique program of cross national and cross tem-
poral social science research. The eﬀort began in early 1970, when the Commission of the European
Community sponsored simultaneous surveys of the publics of the European Community. These surveys
were designed to measure public awareness of, and attitudes toward, the Common Market and other
European Community institutions. After 1973, the survey took on a somewhat broader scope in content
as well as in geographical coverage, with measures of subjective satisfaction and the perceived quality
of life becoming standard features. In 1974, the Commission of the European Community launched the
Eurobarometer series, designed to provide a regular monitoring of the social and political attitudes of the
publics of the nine member-nations: France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg. These Eurobarometer surveys are carried out in the spring and fall
of each year. In addition to obtaining regular readings of support for European integration and the
perceived quality of life, each survey has explored a variety of special topics. Also, attitudes toward
the organization and role of the European Parliament have been explored in each Eurobarometer survey
beginning with Barometer 7 in the spring of 1977. The Eurobarometer surveys have included Greece
since fall 1980, Portugal and Spain since Autumn 1985, the former German Democratic Republic (East
Germany) since 1990, Norway (irregularly) since the fall of 1990, Finland since the spring of 1993, and
Sweden and Austria since the fall of 1994. Of these Eurobarometer surveys, we select a sub-sample of
those in which the following question was asked to the respondents: “I would like to ask you a question
about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you
have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all.” Table A1 shows the number of
observations from each country in our dataset, the number of years the country was sampled and the
y e a r si nw h i c hi tw a ss a m p l e d .
Code Country sampled Number of observations N. of years present in survey Years present
1 France 11,464 8 1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
2 Belgium 9,693 8 1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
3 The Netherlands 10,123 8 1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
4 Germany 11,332 8 1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
5 Italy 11,016 8 1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
6 Luxembourg 3,173 7 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
7 Denmark 7,020 7 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
8 Ireland 7,014 7 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
9 Great Britain 7,498 7 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
10 Northern Ireland 2,158 7 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
11 Greece 6,014 6 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
12 Spain 5,031 5 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
13 Portugal 4,995 5 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995
14 East Germany 3,210 3 1993, 1994, 1995
15 Norway 994 1 1993
16 Finland 2,065 2 1993, 1995
17 Sweden 1,010 1 1995
18 Austria 1,995 1 1995
33A.2. - Genetic distance
Measures of genetic distance between two populations, p1 and p2, are based on the diﬀerence between
the frequencies of alleles in the two populations. We use a measure of genetic distance, called Fst,
(Reynolds et al., 1983) that is also called coancestry coeﬃcient. The latter is not an accurate term,
because it seems to indicate a measure of similarity, while it is really a measure of distance.
Consider m loci, i alleles and deﬁne p1mi the frequency of the ith allele at the mth locus in population
1a n dp2mi the frequency of the ith allele at the mth locus in population 2.












where m is measured over loci, and i over alleles at the mth locus. We use the above formula that
has been calculated for 28 population with an average number of 88 genes.
The calculation of the genetic distance between two populations gives a relative estimate of the time
that has passed since the populations have existed as single cohesive units, under some assumptions of
evolution. When two populations are genetically isolated, the two processes of mutation and genetic drift
lead to diﬀerentiation in the allele frequencies at selective neutral loci. As the amount of time that two
populations are separated increases, the diﬀerence in allele frequencies should also increase until each
population is completely ﬁxed for separate alleles. The Fst measure assumes that there is no mutation,
and that all gene frequency changes are driven by genetic drift alone. However, it does not assume that
population sizes have remained constant and equal in all populations.
34A.3. - Somatic distances
Measures of somatic distance between two populations are based on the distance between anthropo-
metric measures in the two populations. We use anthropometric measures from Biasutti (1954) on three
dimensions: heights, cephalic index, and hair color (pigmentation). The data are only available for the
European countries in our sample. For heights, cephalic index (the ratio of the length and width of the
skull), and hair color (pigmentation), we report the original maps of the prevailing traits in each country
in Europe (reported in Figures I, II, and III). In each trait, European countries fall into three diﬀerent cat-
egories, for example for hair color we have “Blond prevails”, “Mix of blond and dark”, and “Dark prevails”
(The ﬁgure shows ﬁve categories, but only three are found in European countries). We arbitrarily assign
the score of 1 to the ﬁrst, 2 to the second and 3 to the third. We then compute the somatic distance be-
tween two countries as the sum of the absolute value of the diﬀerence in each of these traits. The data are
available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/sapienza/htm/somaticdistance.zip
35Figure I: Average Heights in Europe
Distribution of average heights in Europe. Source Biasutti (1954).
36Figure II: Average cephalic index in Europe
Average cephalic index in Europe. Source Biasutti (1954).
37Figure III: Distribution of hair color in Europe
Distribution of hair color in Europe: 1 = Blond prevails; 2= Mix of blond and dark; 3=Dark
prevails; 4= Sporadic presence of blond; 5= Exclusively dark. Source Biasutti (1954).
38A.4. - First stage regressions for GMM-IV models
Table 2.A presents the ﬁrst stage regressions for the GMM-IV model in Tables 5, 6, and 7. Panel
A has the ﬁrst stage regressions corresponding to the GMM-IV estimates in Table 5, Panel B has the
ﬁrst stage regressions corresponding to the GMM-IV estimates in Table 6, and Panel C contains the ﬁrst
stage regressions corresponding to the GMM-IV estimates in Table 7.
Panel A: First stage regressions for Table 5A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Somatic distance -0.0604*** -0.0604*** -0.0643*** -0.0660*** -0.0742***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0110) (0.0116)
Religious similarity 0.1570** 0.1570** 0.1714** 0.1393*
(0.0717) (0.0717) (0.0714) (0.0725)
Number of years at war -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Press coverage -0.2362 -0.2362 -0.3259 -0.1783 -0.0349
(0.3594) (0.3594) (0.3689) (0.3393) (0.3776)
Transportation costs -0.3833 -0.3833 -0.7018* -0.4972 -0.3383
(0.3392) (0.3392) (0.3688)
Log (distance) -0.0072 -0.0072 0.0129 0.0080 0.0414
(0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0407) (0.0389) (0.0441)
Common border -0.0459 -0.0459 -0.0344 -0.0446 -0.0276
(0.0430) (0.0430) (0.0439) (0.0415) (0.0429)
Common language 0.1178** 0.1178** 0.0887 0.1542*** -0.1125
(0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0730) (0.0574) (0.1040)
Output exporter -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Output importer 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Same legal origin -0.0542 0.0373
(0.0469) (0.0494)
Correlation of consumption -0.0912
between the two countries (0.2767)
Exporting country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Importing country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Year ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Std .err. clustered per pair of country YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 584 584 584 584 464
R-squared 0.699 0.690 0.699 0.701 0.694
F-test of excluded instruments: F( 3, 88) F( 2, 88) F( 1, 88) F( 2, 88) F( 2, 75)
=15.02 =18.19 =26.52 =22.76 =25.64
Instruments Somatic Somatic Somatic Somatic Somatic
(ﬁrst stage regression in appendix) distance, distance, distance, distance, distance,
religion religion religion religion
similarity, similarity similarity similarity
wars
Panel B: First stage regressions for Table 5B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Religious diversity 0.2066*** 0.2559*** 0.1796*** 0.2101***
(0.0691) (0.0595) (0.0655) (0.0618)
Somatic distance -0.0543*** -0.0658*** -0.0576*** -0.0669***
(0.0090) (0.0077) (0.0091) (0.0085)
Transportation costs -0.3122 -0.7393* -0.3162 -0.5374
(0.3773) (0.3824) (0.3050) (0.3275)
Number of years at war (1000-1815) -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Press coverage 0.0019 0.0945 -0.1703 -0.0775
(0.3228) (0.2907) (0.3343) (0.3067)
Log (distance) 0.0150 0.0703* 0.0271 0.0622*
(0.0396) (0.0385) (0.0380) (0.0368)
Common border -0.0577 -0.0460 -0.0379 -0.0311
(0.0367) (0.0319) (0.0364) (0.0328)
Common language 0.1556*** 0.2414*** 0.1311*** 0.1971***
(0.0398) (0.0430) (0.0483) (0.0473)
Output exporter -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Output importer 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Same legal origin -0.1346*** -0.0995**
(0.0450) (0.0445)
Exporting country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Importing country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Year ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Std. err. clustered per pair of country YES YES YES YES
Observations 19721 19721 111425 111425
R-squared 0.733 0.743 0.718 0.723
F-test of excluded instruments
(religion similarity and somatic F(2, 88) F( 2, 88) F( 2, 88) F( 2, 88)
distance): =22.86 =48.94 =27.31 =40.90
39Panel C: First stage regressions for Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Religious similarity 0.2081*** 0.2278*** 0.1557** 0.1477**
(0.0616) (0.0636) (0.0631) (0.0647)
Somatic distance -0.0384*** -0.0324** -0.0290** -0.0286**
(0.0110) (0.0135) (0.0125) (0.0126)
Number of years at war -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0009*
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Common border -0.0453 -0.0313 -0.0379 -0.0432
(0.0437) (0.0533) (0.0508) (0.0514)
Common language 0.1413*** 0.1522*** 0.0891* 0.0813
(0.0421) (0.0471) (0.0513) (0.0553)
Log (distance) -0.0206 -0.0223 -0.0336 -0.0398
(0.0442) (0.0459) (0.0455) (0.0486)
Inverse Cov. of stock market returns -0.1886** -0.2056** -0.2099** -0.2009**
of country of origin and destination (0.0804) (0.0950) (0.0927) (0.0855)
Press coverage -0.4642 -0.7669 -0.7120
(0.5745) (0.5714) (0.5800)
Same legal origin 0.1012** 0.1079**
(0.0423) (0.0409)
Distance in security law regulation -0.0073
(0.0077)
Investing country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Destination country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Std .err. clustered per pair of country YES YES YES YES
Observations 118 107 107 107
R-squared 0.909 0.910 0.916 0.917
F-test of excluded instruments
(religion similarity and somatic F( 2,64) F(2,63) F(2,63) F(2,63)
distance): =13.53 =10.52 =6.19 =5.67
Panel D: First stage regressions for Table 7
(1) (2) (3)
Religious diversity 0.1937* 0.2602*** 0.2361**
(0.1019) (0.0918) (0.0964)
Somatic distance -0.0463*** -0.0557*** -0.0494***
(0.0140) (0.0156) (0.0143)
Number of years at war -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0015***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Press coverage -0.8071* -0.6598 -0.6741*
(0.4285) (0.4235) (0.3857)
Log (distance) -0.0044 0.0092 0.0426
(0.0475) (0.0465) (0.0450)
Common border 0.0211 0.0192 0.0159
(0.0509) (0.0472) (0.0438)
Common language 0.1743** 0.2419*** 0.2592***
(0.0744) (0.0711) (0.0670)




Investing country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES
Destination country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES
Year ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES
Std. err. clustered per pair of country YES YES YES
Observations 428 428 428
R-squared 0.737 0.744 0.754
F-test of excluded instruments F(2,73)= F( 2, 73)= F( 2, 73)=
(religion similarity and somatic distance): 9.19 13.16 10.57
40Figure 1
Fixed eﬀects of country of origin relative to Ireland
41Figure 2
Fixed eﬀects of country of destination relative to Ireland
42Table 1:
The trust matrix
The matrix in panel A shows the average trust from citizens of a given country to citizens of other
countries. Trust is calculated by taking the average response to the following question: “I would like to
ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please
tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all”. The answers
are coded in the following way:=1 ( no trust at all), = 2 (not very much trust), =3 (some trust), =4
(a lot of trust). The last row is the average trust that citizens of a given country exhibit toward all the
other countries; the last column shows the average trust that citizens of a given country receive from all
the other countries. It gives a summary measure of how trustworthy are the citizens of the country in
each row. The matrix in panel B shows the percentage share of citizens of a given European country
who report they trust a lot their fellow citizens and citizens of the other European countries. The last
row is the average percentage share of those that in a given country report they trust a lot, and gives a
summary measure of how much citizens of a given country trust citizens of their own or other countries.
The last column shows the average share of the citizens of diﬀerent countries that trust a lot citizens of
the country in each given row; it gives a summary measure of how trustworthy are the citizens of the





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bilateral trust and country-of-origin and country-of-destination
characteristics
Panel A shows how much of the trust of the average trust of a country’s citizens versus the other
country’s citizens is explained by observed and unobserved characteristics of the country receiving and
giving trust. “Mean trust” is the average trust across individuals of a given country; “median trust”
uses the median to aggregate across individuals; “share of individuals trusting a lot” is the fraction of
interviewed individuals in a given country that report they trust a lot the citizens of another country.
Besides country-of-origin and country-of-destination ﬁxed eﬀects, the regression includes a year ﬁxed
eﬀect. The omitted country is Ireland. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for
the potential clustering at the country of destination level. Panel B is the matrix of the residuals in the
regression of the ﬁrst column of Panel A.
The symbols ***, **, and * mean that the coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero respectively
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
46Panel A:
Fraction of individuals
Mean trust Median trust trusting a lot
Origin country (base=Ireland)
Fra -0.0847* -0.1211** -0.0041
(0.0496) (0.0438) (0.0225)
Bel -0.0555 -0.1262*** 0.0274
(0.0488) (0.0449) (0.0259)
NL 0.0729 -0.0814 0.0173
(0.0494) (0.0512) (0.0254)
Ger(west) -0.0756 -0.1504* 0.0272
(0.0649) (0.0780) (0.0295)
Ita -0.1872*** -0.2392*** -0.0281
(0.0582) (0.0749) (0.0220)
Lux -0.0873 -0.1627** 0.0071
(0.0553) (0.0717) (0.0297)
Den 0.1647*** 0.0119 0.0827***
(0.0452) (0.0534) (0.0238)
UK -0.0353 -0.0873 0.0059
(0.0603) (0.0525) (0.0226)
NorthIre -0.1134*** -0.1071** -0.0331**
(0.0352) (0.0398) (0.0129)
Greece -0.2586*** -0.2878*** 0.0568*
(0.0844) (0.0918) (0.0326)
Spain -0.2169*** -0.2843*** 0.0175
(0.0702) (0.0744) (0.0300)
Portugal -0.2150*** -0.2426*** -0.0329
(0.0644) (0.0577) (0.0297)
Ger(East) -0.0460 -0.2109** 0.0491
(0.0767) (0.0950) (0.0297)
Norway 0.1272** 0.0317 0.0884***
(0.0612) (0.0982) (0.0306)
Finland 0.2170*** 0.1393** 0.1320***
(0.0562) (0.0668) (0.0331)
Sweden 0.4301*** 0.3393*** 0.2678***
(0.0439) (0.0981) (0.0293)
Austria -0.0668 -0.2207** 0.0651**
(0.0654) (0.1050) (0.0301)
Destination country (base=Ireland)
Fra 0.0540*** -0.0442*** 0.0095***
(0.0046) (0.0072) (0.0009)
Bel 0.2009*** 0.0591*** 0.0292***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
NL 0.2543*** 0.0161*** 0.0630***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Ger(west) 0.0802*** 0.0534*** 0.0486***
(0.0045) (0.0071) (0.0009)
Ita -0.2168*** -0.2619*** -0.0752***
(0.0047) (0.0073) (0.0009)
Lux 0.2855*** 0.1022*** 0.0703***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Den 0.2574*** 0.0806*** 0.0612***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UK 0.0790*** -0.0665*** 0.0240***
(0.0056) (0.0089) (0.0011)
Greece -0.1667*** -0.0995*** -0.0492***
(0.0042) (0.0080) (0.0006)
Spain -0.0731*** -0.0513*** -0.0363***
(0.0042) (0.0080) (0.0006)
Portugal -0.1033*** -0.1236*** -0.0476***
(0.0042) (0.0080) (0.0006)
Ger (East) -0.1813*** -0.2408*** -0.0776***
(0.0180) (0.0336) (0.0042)
Norway 0.3171*** 0.2436*** 0.0901***
(0.0125) (0.0183) (0.0029)
Finland 0.2676*** 0.1848*** 0.0627***
(0.0125) (0.0183) (0.0029)
Sweden 0.3359*** 0.1259*** 0.0858***
(0.0125) (0.0183) (0.0029)
Austria 0.2500*** 0.1259*** 0.0631***
(0.0125) (0.0183) (0.0029)
(continues)
47P a n e lA :( c o n t i n u e s )
Destination country (base=Ireland)
US 0.0803*** -0.0410*** -0.0617***
(0.0056) (0.0089) (0.0011)
Bulgaria -0.3725*** -0.4716*** -0.1169***
(0.0180) (0.0336) (0.0042)
China -0.5415*** -0.7934*** -0.0865***
(0.0131) (0.0220) (0.0025)
Czech Republic -0.2887*** -0.3663*** -0.0911***
(0.0100) (0.0163) (0.0025)
Hungary -0.2284*** -0.2997*** -0.0802***
(0.0100) (0.0163) (0.0025)
Japan -0.1271*** -0.0787*** -0.0141***
(0.0040) (0.0079) (0.0011)
Poland -0.2569*** -0.3330*** -0.0770***
(0.0100) (0.0163) (0.0025)
Romania -0.3423*** -0.3947*** -0.1071***
(0.0180) (0.0336) (0.0042)
Russia -0.5854*** -0.8369*** -0.1016***
(0.0056) (0.0089) (0.0011)
Slovenia -0.4064*** -0.5211*** -0.0984***
(0.0125) (0.0183) (0.0029)
Switzerland 0.3979*** 0.1215*** 0.1371***
(0.0090) (0.0150) (0.0015)
Turkey -0.7266*** -1.0172*** -0.1241***
(0.0087) (0.0146) (0.0017)
Constant 2.6779*** 2.9303*** 0.1313***
(0.0353) (0.0476) (0.0153)
Year ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES
Dummies for country F( 17, 1964) = 31.84 F( 17, 1964) = 9.49 F( 17, 2764) = 25.98
of origin: F-test p-value=0.000 p-value=0.000 p-value=0.000
Dummies for country F(28, 1964) =88.41 F( 8,1964) =39.51 F( 28, 1964) = 33.67
of destination: F-test p-value=0.000 p-value=0.000 p-value=0.000
Observations 1747 1747 1747














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A contains summary statistics for trust and for the bilateral controls. Trust is calculated by
taking the average response to the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how
much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of
trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all”. The answers are coded in the following way:=1
( no trust at all), = 2 (not very much trust), =3 (some trust), =4 (a lot of trust). The sample statistics
presented here for trust are obtained after collapsing the data by taking time averages (after partialling
out time eﬀects). Distance is the log distance between the capital of two countries. Common border is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if two countries share at least one border (it is coded 1, if countries are the
same). Common language is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the two countries share the same oﬃcial
language. Same legal origin is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if two countries share the same origin
of law (i.e., English, French, German, or Scandinavian), following the La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁcation.
Religious similarity measures the fraction of people with the same religious faith in the two countries.
Genetic distance is the coancestry coeﬃcient (Reynolds et al., 1983) calculated by Cavalli-Sforza et al.
(1996). Somatic distance between two populations is based on the distance between three anthropometric
measures: heights, hair colors (pigmentation), and cephalic index (Biasutti, 1954). Number of years
at war have been calculated using the current nations’ borders as deﬁnition of the countries. Press
coverage is the number of times a country name appears in the headlines of the major newspaper in each
country over the total number of foreign news. The cross correlation matrix of the variables included
in Panel A, obtained after controlling for country-of-origin and country-of-destination ﬁxed eﬀects, is
shown in Panel B. Panel C shows summary statistics for the trade dataset. The data contains export
volume for a panel of 18 European Countries in the period between 1970 and 1996 (Source: Statistics
of Canada). Output importer and exporter are respectively the GDP of the importing and exporting
country. Transportation costs between pair of countries are calculated following Giuliano, Spilimbergo,
and Tonon (2006) as the shipping quotes in year 2006 collected by Import Export Wizard (IEW), a
shipping company that calculates the surface freight estimates of transportation costs in U.S. dollars for
a “1000 kg unspeciﬁed freight type load (including machinery, chemicals, etc.) with no special handling
required, using the optimal combination of going through land and water to transport the goods.” The
correlation of consumption between pairs of countries is obtained by correlating the level of consumption
by ISIC codes between country i and country j for years 1989-94 (Source: Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006).
Consumption in each ISIC code/country is deﬁned as GDP plus imports, minus exports. Panel D shows
summary statistics for the foreign direct investment data. Outward stock of FDI (log) is from the OECD
data and includes a panel between 1970 and 1996 of 18 European countries. Panel E shows summary
statistics for the portfolios datasets. The percentage invested in the partner country is the net portfolio
investment of a given country into another country deﬁned as the stock of cross-border holdings of
equities and long- and short-term debt securities valued at market prices prevailing at the end of 2001
(from Morningstar data) divided by the sum of all foreign equity holdings plus market capitalization-
foreign liabilities. The inverse of the covariance of stock market returns is calculated using monthly data
for each country (DATASTREAM). Following Vlachos (2004), distance in security law regulation is the
sum of the absolute diﬀerence between the score in 21 characteristics analyzed in La Porta et al. (2005).
50Panel A: Trust and control variables
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Average trust 0.073 0.058 0.382 -1.348 1.033 319
Median trust 0.071 0.195 0.428 -1.813 1.247 319
Fraction of individuals trusting a lot 0.030 -0.016 0.136 -0.156 0.554 319
Distance 7.018 7.274 1.783 0.000 9.320 319
Common border 0.160 0.000 0.367 0.000 1.000 319
Common language 0.074 0.000 0.252 0.000 1.000 319
Same legal origin 0.279 0.000 0.449 0.000 1.000 319
Religious similarity 0.307 0.256 0.289 0.000 1.000 319
Genetic distance (Fst values x10000) 86.086 61.000 145.995 0.000 1244.000 267
Somatic distance 2.432 2.000 1.384 0.000 5.000 278
Number of years at war (1000-1970) 13.386 1.000 28.618 0.000 198.000 319
Number of years at war (1815-1970) 1.442 0.000 3.202 0.000 20.000 319
Number of years at war (1000-1815) 11.944 0.000 28.069 0.000 197.000 319
Press coverage 0.043 0.020 0.068 0.000 0.440 262































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































52Panel C: Statistics of Canada
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Log of export to partner country 14.79262 14.79733 1.583245 9.941217 17.82963 584
Average trust from importer to exporter 2.736455 2.737656 0.276172 1.99384 3.569197 584
Press coverage 0.039507 0.020673 0.04973 0 0.313644 584
Distance 6.857758 7.00996 0.687951 5.156525 8.121116 584
Common border 0.210616 0 0.408096 0 1 584
Common language 0.065068 0 0.246858 0 1 584
Religious similarity 0.330321 0.324747 0.254621 0 0.82643 584
Somatic distance 2.486301 3 1.20312 0 5 584
Same origin of the law 0.30137 0 0.459246 0 1 584
Numbers of years at war 1000-1815 23.99658 7.5 38.21614 0 197 584
Output importer 21353.37 20000 6949.855 9310 35100 584
Output exporter 20861.71 20000 7013.854 9310 35100 584
Transportation costs 5.189008 5.17615 0.075086 5.075174 5.517453 584
Correlation of consumption by industry between exporter and importer 0.893156 0.903117 0.059586 0.724143 0.988357 464
Panel D: OECD Foreign Direct Investment
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Outward stock of FDI (log) 21.11472 21.39692 2.155451 12.41738 24.17526 428
Average trust from country to each partner 2.760419 2.765738 0.259903 2.103876 3.527406 428
Press coverage 0.051872 0.038305 0.056469 0 0.313644 428
Distance 6.771188 6.961451 0.722849 5.156525 8.121116 428
Common border 0.242991 0 0.429391 0 1 428
Common language 0.088785 0 0.284766 0 1 428
Same legal origin 0.324766 0 0.468836 0 1 428
Religious similarity 0.370434 0.337845 0.231608 0.014419 0.82643 428
Somatic distance 2.672897 3 1.27138 0 5 428
Numbers of years at war 1000-1815 29.50701 9 44.54219 0 197 428
Transportation costs 5.181547 5.153292 0.086133 5.075174 5.517453 428
Panel E: Porfolio data (Morningstar)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Percentage invested in partner country 0.038747 0.030742 0.028719 0.001898 0.141822 118
Inverse Covariance of stock market returns -0.0704 -0.0405 0.152723 -0.58964 0.128104 118
Common border 0.228814 0 0.42186 0 1 118
Common language 0.039502 0 0.161499 0 1 118
Distance 6.786523 6.957813 0.621142 5.156525 7.861671 118
Press coverage 0.037208 0.021825 0.038247 0 0.179437 107
Average trust from investing country to partner 2.908322 2.900849 0.301368 2.305565 3.650389 118
Religious similarity 0.31798 0.322374 0.236312 0.011738 0.874539 118
Somatic distance 2.652542 3 1.263404 0 5 118
Distance in the characteristics of security laws (LLSV) 7.28017 6.705 2.323434 1.83 12.4 118
Numbers of Years at war 1000-1815 29.50848 14 39.77689 0 197 118
Same legal origin 0.245763 0 0.432374 0 1 118
53Table 4:
Determinant of Trust
The dependent variable is the average trust across individuals of a given country toward citizens of
other countries. To appropriately estimate the standard errors, we ﬁrst regressed the observations on
year ﬁxed eﬀects, then we took the residual and collapsed the observations by year. Trust is calculated
by taking the average response to the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how
much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of
trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all”. The answers are coded in the following way:=1
(no trust at all), = 2 (not very much trust), =3 (some trust), =4 (a lot of trust). Common language
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the two countries share the same oﬃcial language. Log distance is
calculated using the distance in kilometers between the capital of the two countries. Common border is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if two countries share at least one border (it is coded 1, if countries are
the same). Number of years at war is calculated using the current nations borders as deﬁnition of the
countries. Religious similarity measures the fraction of people with the same religious faith in the two
countries. Genetic distance is the coancestry coeﬃcient (Reynolds et al., 1983) calculated by Cavalli-
Sforza et al. (1996). Somatic distance between two populations is based on the distance between three
anthropometric measures: heights, hair colors (pigmentation), and cephalic index (Biasutti, 1954). Press
coverage is the number of times a country name appears in the headlines of the major newspaper in each
country over the total number of foreign news (source: Factiva). For each pair of countries, i and j, it
is the percentage of news in the selected newspaper of country i about country j. Diﬀerences in GDP
per capita is the average diﬀerence in percentage term over the period 1970-1996. Same legal origin is
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if two countries share the same origin of law (i.e., English, French,
German, or Scandinavian), following the La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁcation. The regressions include
country of origin and country of destination. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected
for the potential clustering at the pair-of-countries level. Panel A shows the results for the entire sample,
while Panel B shows the results restricted to countries belonging to the European Union.
The symbols ***, **, and * mean that the coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero respectively
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A: Whole sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Common language 0.1078* 0.1123* 0.1019 0.0910 0.1411** 0.1086* 0.0869
(0.0588) (0.0665) (0.0673) (0.0647) (0.0607) (0.0610) (0.0617)
Distance -0.0816** -0.0252 -0.0260 -0.0177 -0.0030 0.0022 0.0027
(0.0402) (0.0408) (0.0412) (0.0396) (0.0326) (0.0302) (0.0307)
Common border -0.0242 -0.0026 0.0025 -0.0145 0.0420 0.0422 0.0426
(0.0525) (0.0481) (0.0486) (0.0458) (0.0454) (0.0437) (0.0433)
Number of years at war 1000-1970 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Number of years at war 1000-1815 -0.0006
(0.0007)
Number of years at war 1815-1970 -0.0034
(0.0044)
Religious similarity 0.1867*** 0.1839*** 0.1552*** 0.2179*** 0.1920*** 0.1717***
(0.0549) (0.0566) (0.0548) (0.0504) (0.0492) (0.0510)
Genetic distance (Fst) -12.1283*** -12.0475*** -7.9091*
(4.4240) (4.4273) (4.5667)
Somatic distance -0.0303*** -0.0246*** -0.0206** -0.0157*
(0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0088) (0.0086)
Press coverage -0.9308** -0.9858** -1.1496***
(0.4347) (0.4269) (0.4383)
Diﬀerences in GDP per capita (percentage) -0.1072*** -0.1111***
(0.0358) (0.0354)
Same legal origin 0.0449
(0.0408)
Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin is -0.1095 0.0290 0.0276 0.0897
equal to country of destination (0.2559) (0.2379) (0.2379) (0.2365)
Country-of-origin ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-of-destination ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard error clustered per pair of country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 319 265 265 261 225 225 225
R-squared 0.822 0.812 0.812 0.822 0.871 0.881 0.882
54Panel B: European Union sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Common language 0.0507 0.0968 0.0653 0.0849 0.1144 0.1126* 0.0451 0.0498
(0.0880) (0.0821) (0.0812) (0.0758) (0.0722) (0.0658) (0.0697) (0.0701)
Log (distance) -0.1346*** -0.0848** -0.0892** -0.0772* -0.0628* -0.0390 -0.0370 -0.0295
(0.0467) (0.0427) (0.0434) (0.0405) (0.0321) (0.0320) (0.0321) (0.0343)
Common border -0.0374 -0.0355 -0.0191 -0.0715 -0.0391 -0.0259 -0.0204 -0.0223
(0.0583) (0.0500) (0.0513) (0.0461) (0.0437) (0.0425) (0.0421) (0.0420)
Number of years at war 1000-1970 -0.0010 -0.0009* -0.0010** -0.0009* -0.0009** -0.0010**
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Number of years at war 1000-1815 -0.0009
(0.0007)
Number of years at war 1815-1970 -0.0077
(0.0051)
Religious similarity 0.2023*** 0.1922*** 0.1340** 0.1867*** 0.1790*** 0.1324*** 0.1288**
(0.0589) (0.0627) (0.0576) (0.0498) (0.0493) (0.0487) (0.0498)
Genetic distance (Fst) -9.1947* -9.0239* -4.2044
(4.8485) (4.8330) (5.0532)
Somatic distance -0.0510*** -0.0453*** -0.0395*** -0.0292*** -0.0289***
(0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0100)
Press coverage -0.5051 -0.6601* -0.8034** -0.7800**
(0.4016) (0.3816) (0.3861) (0.3797)
Diﬀerences in GDP per capita (percentage) -0.1000** -0.1088*** -0.1018**
(0.0411) (0.0390) (0.0389)




Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin is -0.4199 -0.3459 -0.3620 -0.2941
equal to country of destination (0.2920) (0.2315) (0.2292) (0.2334)
Country-of-origin ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-of-destination ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Std.err. clustered per pair of country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 222 219 219 219 177 177 177 177
R-squared 0.799 0.813 0.816 0.835 0.857 0.864 0.868 0.869
55Table 5:
Eﬀect of Trust on Trade
In Panel A the dependent variable is the log of the aggregate export volume from country i to country
j, for a panel of 18 European Union countries during the period 1970-1996. Mean trust is the average
level of trust between individuals of country j toward citizens of country i. Press coverage is the number
of times a country name appears in the headlines of the major newspaper in each country over the total
number of foreign news (source: Factiva). For each pair of countries, it is the percentage of news in
the selected newspaper of country i about country j. Transportation costs among these countries are
calculated following Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006). The log of transportation cost between
two countries is the log the shipping quotes in year 2006 collected by Import Export Wizard (IEW), a
shipping company that calculates the surface freight estimates of transportation costs in U.S. dollars for
a “1000 kg unspeciﬁed freight type load (including machinery, chemicals, etc.) with no special handling
required, using the optimal combination of going through land and water to transport the goods.” Log
distance is the log distance between the capital of the two countries. Common border is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the two countries share at least one border (it is coded 1, if countries are the same). Common
language is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the two countries share the same oﬃcial language. Output
exporter and output importer are respectively the GDP of the exporting and importing country. Number
of years at war is the number of years the two countries have been at war between 1000 and 1815 and
have been calculated using the current nations borders as deﬁnition of the countries. Same legal origin is
an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if two countries share the same origin of law (i.e., English, French,
German, or Scandinavian), following the La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁcation. Correlation of consumption
between the two countries is obtained by correlating the level of consumption by ISIC codes between
country i and country j for years 1989-94 (Source: Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006). Consumption in each
ISIC code/country is deﬁned as GDP plus imports, minus exports. All regressions include ﬁxed eﬀects
for the country of origin and for the destination country. The standard errors reported in parentheses
are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the pair-of-countries level. Regressions in
columns 1, 5, and 7 are OLS regressions. Regressions in columns 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 are estimated using the
generalized method of moments instrumental variables estimator (GMM-IV). In column 2 the instruments
are religion similarity, somatic distance, and number of years the two countries have been at war between
1000 and 1815. In columns 3, 6, and 8 the instruments are religion diversity and somatic distance. In
column 4 the only instrument is religion diversity. When the equation is overidentiﬁed by an abundance
of instruments, a test of overidentifying restrictions, Hansen’s “J” statistic (1982), is also reported. The
test is calculated from the ﬁrst stage residuals of the estimation procedure. We also report the F-test of
the excluded instruments. The ﬁrst stage regressions are reported in the appendix of the paper.
In panel B the dependent variable is the log of the disaggregated (by industry) log of export volume
for a panel of 18 European Union countries: the ﬁrst 4 columns present the results for industries that
produce goods traded in organized exchanges. The last four columns of Panel B includes industries
producing diﬀerentiated goods. The classiﬁcation of goods follows Rauch (1999).
The symbols ***, **, and * mean that the coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero respectively




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Eﬀect of Trust on Foreign Direct Investments
The dependent variable is the log of outward investment (stocks) from the OECD data (1970- 1996).
Common border is a dummy variable equal to 1 if two countries share at least one border (it is coded
1, if countries are the same). Common language is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the two countries
share the same oﬃcial language. Common origin of the law is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if two
countries share the same origin of law (i.e., English, French, German, or Scandinavian), following the
La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁcation. Religious similarity measures the fraction of people with the same
religious faith in the two countries. Somatic distance between two populations is based on the distance
between three anthropometric measures: heights, hair color (pigmentation), and cephalic index (Biasutti,
1954). Number of years at war have been calculated using the current nations borders as deﬁnition of
the countries. Press coverage is the number of times a country name appears in the headlines of the
major newspaper in each country over the total number of foreign news (source: Factiva). For each pair
of countries, i and j, it is the percentage of news in the selected newspaper of country i about country
j. All regressions include ﬁxed eﬀects for the country of origin and for the destination country. The
standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the
pair-of-countries level. The symbols ***, **, and * mean that the coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from
zero respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS GMM-IV OLS GMM-IV OLS GMM-IV
Mean trust toward 1.2121** 7.1313*** 0.9484** 4.5786*** 0.9537** 5.2496***
people in destination country (0.5202) (2.3338) (0.4707) (1.1701) (0.4447) (1.4080)
Press coverage 0.4528 7.2579 -0.6107 3.8034 -0.6085 4.4221
(2.7153) (4.9998) (2.3174) (2.9480) (2.3314) (3.0928)
Log (distance) -0.7892** -0.4605 -0.8081*** -0.6117 -0.8120** -0.8296**
(0.3790) (0.5330) (0.3030) (0.3957) (0.3128) (0.3820)
Common border 0.2135 -0.2798 0.0748 -0.2394 0.0754 -0.2217
(0.2804) (0.5037) (0.2594) (0.3286) (0.2611) (0.3291)
Common language 0.0572 -0.8946 -0.6738 -1.1194** -0.6775 -1.3917**
(0.4498) (0.8206) (0.4399) (0.5583) (0.4528) (0.6172)
Number of years at war 0.0054* 0.0124*** 0.0041 0.0083** 0.0041 0.0105***
(0.0027) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0035)
Same origin of the law 1.2223*** 1.0271*** 1.2266*** 1.2652***
(0.3193) (0.3465) (0.3546) (0.4151)
Transportations costs 0.0838 5.1703*
(2.4258) (2.6387)
Investing country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
St.err. clustered per pair of country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 428 428 428 428 428 428
R-squared 0.842 0.867 0.867
Prob ¿ F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.331 0.146 0.103
Chi-sq P-val 0.565 0.702 0.748
Test of excluded F(2,73) F( 2, 73) F( 2, 73)
instruments in ﬁrst stage: = 9.19 = 13.16 = 10.57





Eﬀect of Trust on Portfolio Investment
The dependent variable measures the percentage of net portfolio investment of a given country into
another country. Speciﬁcally, the dependent variable is the stock of cross-border holdings of equities
and long- and short-term debt securities valued at market prices prevailing at the end of 2001 (from
Morningstar data) divided by the sum of all foreign equity holdings plus market capitalization- of foreign
liabilities. The sample includes all European Union countries and Switzerland. Control variables include
the inverse of the covariance of stock market returns, calculated using monthly data for each country
(DATASTREAM). Border is a dummy variable equal to 1 if two countries share at least one border (it
is coded as 1 if countries are the same). Common language is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the two
countries share the same oﬃcial language. Same origin of the law is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
if two countries share the same origin of law (i.e., English, French, German, or Scandinavian), following
the La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁcation. Religious similarity measures the fraction of people with the
same religious faith in the two countries. Following Vlachos (2004), distance in security law regulation
is the sum of the absolute diﬀerence between the score in 21 characteristics analyzed in La Porta et al.
(2006). Somatic distance between two populations is based on the distance between three anthropometric
measures: heights, hair colors (pigmentation), and cephalic index (Biasutti, 1954). Number of years at
war have been calculated using the current nations borders as deﬁnition of the countries. Press coverage
is the number of times a country name appears in the headlines of the major newspaper in each country
over the total number of foreign news (source: Factiva). For each pair of countries, i and j,i ti st h e
percentage of news in the selected newspaper of country i about country j. All regressions include
ﬁxed eﬀects for the country of origin and for the destination country. The standard errors reported in
parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the pair-of-countries level. The
symbols ***, **, and * mean that the coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero respectively at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS GMM-IV OLS GMM-IV OLS GMM-IV OLS GMM-IV
Mean trust toward 0.1116** 0.2134** 0.1370** 0.2743*** 0.0365 0.1567 0.1444*** 0.2807***
people in destination country (0.0482) (0.0921) (0.0548) (0.0971) (0.0425) (0.0980) (0.0508) (0.0929)
Inverse Cov. of stock market returns -0.0013 0.0156 -0.0018 0.0167 -0.0262 -0.0052 -0.0084 0.0081
of country of origin and destination (0.0331) (0.0298) (0.0399) (0.0397) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0383) (0.0357)
Common border -0.0003 -0.0036 -0.0121 -0.0137 -0.0254 -0.0168 -0.0076 -0.0073
(0.0278) (0.0239) (0.0303) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0215) (0.0292) (0.0238)
Common language 0.0081 -0.0043 -0.0186 -0.0434* -0.0495** -0.0557*** -0.0167 -0.0418**
(0.0217) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0231) (0.0198) (0.0207) (0.0204)
Log (distance) -0.0334 -0.0285 -0.0257 -0.0169 -0.0342 -0.0242 -0.0209 -0.0095
(0.0266) (0.0226) (0.0274) (0.0230) (0.0226) (0.0196) (0.0267) (0.0227)
Number of years at war 0.0004* 0.0003*** 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0004** 0.0003**
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Press coverage 0.5363** 0.6489** 0.2561 0.3857 0.4742* 0.5857**
(0.2503) (0.2602) (0.2201) (0.2419) (0.2386) (0.2485)
Same legal origin 0.0807*** 0.0516**
(0.0213) (0.0213)
Distance in security law regulation 0.0064* 0.0076***
(0.0036) (0.0029)
Investing country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination country ﬁxed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
St.err. clustered per pair of country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 118 118 107 107 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.403 0.426 0.527 0.445
Prob ¿ F 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.108 0.576 2.100 0.566
Chi-sq P-val 0.743 0.448 0.147 0.452
Test of excluded F( 2,64) F(2,63) F(2,63) F(2,63)
instruments in ﬁrst stage: =13.53 = 10.52 = 6.19 =9.77
Instruments Somatic Somatic Somatic Somatic
distance, distance, distance, distance,
religion religion religion religion
diversity diversity diversity diversity
60